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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT
OF HELSINKI: THE CREATION OF NEW




During his recent visit to Poland, in an address to the Polish Sejm,
the Soviet Secretary-General Gorbachev proposed to convene a Euro-
pean security conference, a "Pan-European Reykjavik" as he called it,
and to establish a European Centre in the framework of which the
Warsaw Pact and NATO organizations should cooperate in order to
reduce the threat of war.'
More than thirty years before, at the Four Power Conference in
Berlin in 1954, Foreign Minister Molotov, another high Soviet official,
also proposed a European security conference. 2 This proposal, with
important amendments, ultimately led to the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe ("CSCE") in 1973-1975, and to the sign-
ing of the Final Act of Helsinki by the participating states on August
1, 1975.3 Although Gorbachev referred to the CSCE, and to its fol-
low-up meeting in Vienna - which was still going on at that moment
- remarkably enough the CSCE was neither chosen as the forum for
launching these proposals nor proposed as the framework for coopera-
tion between the two defense organizations, whose Member States all
participate in the CSCE process and have signed the Final Act of Hel-
sinki. Would the CSCE not have been the appropriate framework? Is
it indeed preferable, for practical, political or any other reasons, to
* This article is partly based upon the text of a lecture delivered at the University of Warsaw
on June 1, 1988.
** Professor of the law of international organizations, Utrecht University, the Netherlands.
Fulbright-Hays Scholar for Advanced Research, University of Michigan Law School, 1970-71.
1. 1988 EUROPA-ARCHly D416-20.
2. See SICIERHEITSKONFERENZ IN EUROPA: DOKUMENTATION 1954-1972 363. (F.
Schramm et al. eds. 1972) [hereinafter Schramm]. See also HELSINKI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
EUROPEAN SECURITY: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION 3 (V. Mastny ed. 1986) [hereinafter
Mastny].
3. For the official six-language edition of the Final Act, see CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE: FINAL ACT (1975), English text at 75-135 [hereinafter FINAL ACT];
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1293-1325 (1975).
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establish a new European institution for cooperation in the field of
security outside of the CSCE structure?
The patterns of international relations within the CSCE process,
and the structures and procedures based upon and connected with its
basic document, the Final Act of Helsinki, lend themselves very well
to some reflection on the following question: under what conditions is
it feasible, and preferable, to root new efforts towards multilateral co-
operation in existing international organizations or other existing
structures, or alternatively to create a new international organization
or a new structure for this purpose. Indeed, whenever the establish-
ment of an international organization as a juridical framework and a
catalyst for international cooperation is considered, failure to take into
account the conditions under which an existing institution can suitably
and efficiently be used for that purpose can easily result in an early
failure of the new organization, or in a burdensome structure with few
effective advantages. 4
First, this essay will give some basic information on the character
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as a process
and on the legal nature of the Final Act of Helsinki. Second, it will
discuss the follow-up mechanism and its institutional structures. Fi-
nally, the essay will evaluate the present situation and attempt to an-
swer the question whether there is any need for the establishment of
one or more new international organizations or other structures for
the furtherance of the purposes which are (also) covered by the CSCE
and its Final Act.
II. THE CSCE AND ITS FINAL ACT
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe assem-
bled in three phases between July 3, 1973 and August 1, 1975, in Hel-
sinki, Geneva, and Helsinki again. As said above, as a starting point
of the "pre-history" of the CSCE one generally takes the proposal for
a European security conference made by Minister Molotov. That pro-
posal, as would also seem to be the case with Gorbachev's proposal
until now, was not received over-enthusiastically by the Western coun-
tries - mainly because of very strong differences of opinion about the
German question.5
A more direct line with the CSCE begins with the first joint pro-
posals for a conference which emanated from the Warsaw-Pact coun-
4. See van Dijk, The Final Act of Helsinki - Basis for a Pan-European System?, XI NETHER-
LANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 97 (1980).
5. See T. WOLFE, SOVIET POWER AND EUROPE 1945-1969, 75-76 (1970).
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tries at meetings of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw in
1965, and in Bucharest in 1966.6 The proposal made at the latter
meeting was at that time described by Izvestia as "the most compre-
hensive and realistic plan for European security ever offered the people
of Europe."'7
From the beginning the East European States have put an espe-
cially strong emphasis on security and on the recognition of the polit-
ico-ideological status quo in Europe. However, during the long and
very difficult preparatory discussions, and mainly due to pressure from
the Western States, other issues were also placed on the agenda, which
in fact were closely related to security, e.g., economic and technologi-
cal cooperation, and free movement of persons, ideas and informa-
tion.8 During the Conference, proposals concerning these issues were
grouped in four so-called Baskets, and the agreements ultimately
reached on them were accordingly laid down in separate parts of the
Final Act. Basket One deals with questions relating to "Security in
Europe." It contains also the "Declaration on Principles Guiding Re-
lations between Participating States" (the so-called "Decalogue"), and
a "Document on Confidence-building Measures and Certain Aspects
of Security and Disarmament." Basket Two bears on "Co-operation
in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Envi-
ronment." Basket Three relates to "Co-operation in Humanitarian
and Other Fields" and contains provisions on "Human Contacts," on
"Information," and on "Co-operation and Exchange in the Field of
Culture and Education." Then there is a small and relatively unim-
portant part on "Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in
the Mediterranean." The Final Basket is concerned with the "Follow-
up to the Conference."
The CSCE was concluded on August 1, 1975, with the signing of
the Final Act in Helsinki by the Heads of State or Government of the
participating states, which were all the European States except Alba-
nia, plus Canada and the United States (as the non-European NATO-
members). 9 However, the adoption of the Final Act was not meant to
6. For the texts, see Schramm, supra note 2 at 416-18, 425-34. The first proposal was based
upon an initiative by the Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki, expressed in the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly on December 14, 1964.
7. See T. WOLFE, supra note 5, at 309.
8. The latter issue was stressed with growing emphasis by the NATO countries. It was men-
tioned as early as the Declaration of the North Atlantic Council of 4-5 December 1969 at Brus-
sels and, since that time, reappeared regularly in the communiques of the biannual meetings of
the Council. NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, NATO FINAL COMMUNIQUfS 1949-1974, 229-97.
See also, Luchterhandt, Menschenrechtspolitik im KSZE-Prozess, B 19/86 Aus POLITIK UND
ZEITGESCHICHTE, 21-32 (May 10, 1986).
9. FINAL ACT, supra note 3.
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be the end of the CSCE process, but only its beginning. The Final Act
was intended to constitute the basis of a series of conferences, meet-
ings, and other formal and informal consultations to further improve
and intensify the cooperation between the participating states in the
fields covered by the Act. That is precisely why the last Part of the
Final Act was devoted to the follow-up. This follow-up was intended
as a continuation of the multilateral process "by proceeding to a thor-
ough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions
of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference, as well as
in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepen-
ing of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the de-
velopment of cooperation in Europe, and the development of the
process of detente in the future".10
Does the Final Act provide a sufficient and appropriate basis for
this follow-up of the process, both as far as its legal character is con-
cerned and given the institutional structure it provides?
III. THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE FINAL ACT1'
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe did not
lead to the drafting and signing of a treaty, though this had lain in the
original intention of the Russian initiators and their Warsaw-Pact
partners. 12 Although the Final Act does, at fiist sight, perhaps create
the impression of a treaty as regards both its form and content,' 3 all
writers, with one or two exceptions,' 4 are agreed that the accord that
has come about is not the juridical equivalent of a treaty. This point
was also accentuated by various Heads of State or Government at the
end of the Conference.' 5
10. FINAL ACT, supra note 3, at § 2(a).
11. These observations are based upon the author's earlier study, see van Dijk, supra note 4.
12. For the Russian draft treaties on collective security in Europe of 1954 and 1955, see
Schramm, supra note 2, at 364-65, 377-79, 382-83. For the various declarations in the frame-
work of the Warsaw Pact and from individual Warsaw Pact countries on a future European
Treaty, see id, at 385, 386-88, 395-400, 402-05, 408, 413, 418, 434, 441.
13. Cf. Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and the Helsinki Final Act: Conclu-
sions, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 3 (T. Bu-
ergenthal ed. 1977) ("formulated in treaty language without being a treaty").
14. See, e.g., Schweisfurth, Zur Frage der Rechtsnatur, Verbindlichkeit und vlkerrechtlichen
Relevanz der KSZE-Schlussakte, 36 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT
UND VOLKERRECHT 681, 693 (1976), where he refers to the opinion of the Russian writer S.A.
Malinins that on the basis of the concurrence of intention between the participating states, an
agreement has come about which is comparable to a treaty as regards its legal consequences.
15. See the analysis of the Declarations in Klafkowski, CSCE Final Act - the Basis for Legal
Interpretation,8 STUD. INT'L REL. 76, 83-84 (Polish Institute for International Affairs, 1977).
For the text of the Declarations see SICHERHEIT UND ZUSAMMENARBEIT IN EUROPA: ANA-
LYSE UND DOKUMENTATION 1973-1978 (H. Jacobsen ed. 1978).
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The conclusion that the Final Act is not a legally binding agree-
ment does not mean that the matters agreed upon between the partici-
pating states, and laid down in the Final Act, should not be binding.
A commitment does not have to be legally binding in order to have
binding force; the distinction between legal and non-legal binding
force resides in the legal consequences attached to the binding force,
not in the binding force as such. The jotting attributed to certain
members of the British delegation, to the effect that if the Final Act
means anything at all, it is that the participating states announce
therein that they have not taken on any obligations,1 6 is evidence
either of an acid sense of humor, or of disproportionate cynicism. It
was not for this that the Heads of State and Government came to
Helsinki. Many of them alluded quite positively to some sort of bind-
ing force in the course of their declarations.
Indeed, even if the Final Act is not itself an "agreement governed
by international law," 17 it contains various provisions which can be
traced back to such agreements. This is the case first and foremost
with respect to the Charter of the United Nations, to the purposes and
principles of which the Final Act offers numerous references. 8 There
are, thus, several existing international legal norms incorporated into
the Final Act, at least for United Nations Member States. One could
even defend the proposition that those participating states which are
not members of the United Nations, are also legally bound by these
norms, on the one hand because of the universal-constitutional charac-
ter of the Charter, and on the other hand because of the express decla-
ration in the Final Act that the states wished to base themselves on the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.19 In addition, the Fi-
nal Act contains both express and implied references to other treaties
like, for instance, the reference in Principle VII to the obligations aris-
ing from the international treaties on human rights, including the two
United Nations Covenants. For the countries which are parties to
those treaties, these obligations will also form part of the CSCE system
and their implementation forms part of the CSCE process and may be
16. Referred to by Schweisfurth, supra note 14, at 698 n.64.
17. See the definition of "treaty" in Article 2(1)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law
of Treaties, in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 681 (1969).
18. In particular in the Decalogue and the part on "Matters related to giving effect to certain
of the above Principles" linked thereto. For a comprehensive study of the relationship with
United Nations law, see Ghebali, L 'Acte final de la Confirence sur la Sicuriti et la Coopiration
en Europe et les Nations Unies, 1975 ANNUAIRE FRANqAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 73, 80-
83.
19. See, however, the third introductory paragraph of the Decalogue, which contains the
words "in conformity with their membership."
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raised during the review debates. 20
In conclusion it may be stated that the Final Act contains many
binding commitments, several of which are even legally binding,
although the Act itself does not have the character of a legally binding
agreement. This means that, as to its content, the Final Act offers a
sufficient basis for a follow-up mechanism which includes the supervi-
sion of the implementation of these commitments. It also means that
since these commitments have several links with other international
instruments, it would seem to make sense to also link in one way or
another the supervision to the supervisory mechanisms under these
other instruments.
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE FOLLOW-UP OF
THE CSCE PROCESS
The participating states decided not to establish any permanent or-
ganization or organ as a structural basis of the CSCE process. 2' For
the Soviet Union, the signing of the Final Act marked the attainment
of the foremost political objective: recognition of the inviolability of
the current European frontiers. 22 Its inclination towards the original
proposal for a Pan-European security system, as launched by Molotov
in 1954, had steadily declined on account of fears that this would
weaken Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe,23 and because of the in-
clusion of the "Third Basket" on humanitarian matters. The Soviet
Union remained interested primarily in further expansion of economic
relations and technological cooperation, and in continued political
consultations between governments on the extension of d6tente. 24 The
idea of an institutionalized security system received support during the
Conference primarily from Warsaw-Pact countries other than the So-
viet Union, and from some neutral and non-aligned countries, while
Western proposals concerning institutionalization either involved only
certain areas of cooperation like peaceful settlement of disputes, or
referred to existing organizations within which Pan-European consul-
tations could take place and programs could be set up and carried
out.
25
20. See Mastny, supra note 2, at 81-83, where a statement by the Dutch government in a
memorandum submitted to Parliament is quoted.
21. See L. AciMovic, PROBLEMS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, 270-74
(1981).
22. See Maresca, The Inevitable Conclusions, in Mastny, supra note 2, at 74-80.
23. See Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242,
245-46 (1976).
24. See Rand, Soviet Interest in the CSCE Process, in Mastny, supra note 2, 333, 334.
25. See L. AcIMovic, supra note 21, at 270-74.
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The Western viewpoint, which was eventually reflected in the Fi-
nal Act, boiled down to the following: there was a place for far-going
and specific institutionalization only after a satisfactory political and
juridical infrastructure had been created for it by way of a consistent
and dynamic implementation of what had been agreed upon in the
Final Act, and after some experience with the various forms of cooper-
ation had been gained. Thus, only an informal structure was consid-
ered to be necessary and desirable for the time being, in the form of
periodic conferences during which progress and implementation could
be assessed, and the possibilities for extension of the cooperation could
be discussed. Alongside this, there could be conferences and expert
meetings for specific questions.
In fact, several of these specific conferences, meetings and forums
have taken place since the first follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977-
1978: a scientific forum in Hamburg in 1978, an expert meeting on
peaceful settlement of disputes in Montreux in 1978, an expert meet-
ing on cooperation in the Mediterranean in Valetta in 1979, a confer-
ence on confidence building, security, and disarmament in Stockholm
in 1984, an expert meeting on peaceful settlement of disputes in Ath-
ens in 1984, a seminar on cooperation in the Mediterranean in Venice
in 1984, an expert meeting on human rights in Ottawa in 1985, a cul-
tural forum in Budapest in 1985, and an expert meeting on personal
contacts in Bern in 1986.
It is to be expected that this "institutional proliferation" will con-
tinue and will even be intensified after the follow-up meeting in Vi-
enna. One could, therefore, almost speak of a pseudo-international
organization. 26 In addition to these ad hoc structures, the Final Act
foresees possibilities for more institutionalized discussions and cooper-
ation within the framework of existing international organizations. Of
course, the Final Act cannot put these organizations under any obliga-
tion to place issues connected with the CSCE process on their agendas;
the provisions concerned have to be considered as an invitation ex-
tended to the organizations and as an intention on the part of those
participating states which are members of the organizations to discuss
CSCE-related issues within their frameworks. At the follow-up meet-
ings and ad hoc meetings which took place within the CSCE frame-
work, this role of existing organizations has been reconfirmed and in
some respects enlarged.
It is this combination of periodic and ad hoc meetings under the
26. See Pijpers, European Political Co-operation and the CSCE Process, 1984/1 LEGAL IS-
SUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 135, 136.
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Final Act itself on the one hand, and utilization of the forums of ex-
isting organizations on the other hand, which is characteristic of the
institutional structure opted for by the participating states. It has not
been amended or supplemented in any considerable respect during the
follow-up meetings which took place in Belgrade, 27 Madrid, 28 and Vi-
enna, 29 although proposals to that effect were made regularly. 30 Is the
present structure adequate for the implementation of the Final Act?
V. THE INVOLVEMENT OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
The structure opted for by the participating states implies that
those international organizations, whose functional fields of action
cover issues which have also been defined as elements of cooperation
in the Final Act, potentially have an important role to play in the
follow-up of the CSCE process and in the implementation of the Final
Act.
At present, this holds good in particular for the Second Basket:
cooperation in the field of economics, science and technology, and en-
vironment. In that field many world-wide and regional organizations
are active, which may offer appropriate forums for discussion and co-
operation in a Pan-European context. The participating states have
recognized this fact and have assigned an important role to some of
these organizations in the implementation of this part of the Final Act.
Thus it is stated in the preamble to the Second Basket that the partici-
pating states have taken into account "the work already undertaken by
the relevant international organizations" and wish "to take advantage
of the possibilities offered by these organizations, in particular by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, for giving effect to
the provisions of the final documents of the Conference."
In the Second Basket, in addition to the Economic Commission for
Europe ("ECE"), there is reference to the United Nations Economic,
Social, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") and its Universal
System for Information in Science and Technology ("UNISIST") pro-
27. From October 4, 1977 until March 3, 1978. For the Final Document, see 17 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 414 (1978).
28. From November 11, 1980 until September 9, 1983. For the Final Document, see 22
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1398 (1983).
29. Started at November 4, 1986. At the moment of writing the meeting was still going on.
30. See N. ROPERS & P. SCHLLOrrER, DIE INSTITUTIONALISIERUNGSDEBATTE IM KSZE-
PROZESS: GESCHICHTE, MODELLE, EVALUATION, HSFK-Report 7/1986 of the Hessische Stif-
tung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung 30-34 (1986). For the proposals made at the cultural
forum in Budapest in 1985 to establish a Pan-European organization for culture and art, see
Knabe, Der schwierige Kulturdialog in Europa, 1986 OSTEUROPA 380.
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gram, 31 the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, 32 the
Danube Commission, 33 the International Labour Organization, 34 and
the United Nations Environment Programme. 35 Moreover, the fol-
lowing international organizations are involved, in one way or an-
other, in the implementation of the provisions of Basket II: the Food
and Agricultural Organization; the International Atomic Energy
Agency; the International Oceanographic Commission; the United
Nations Programme for Space Research; the World Health Organiza-
tion; the World Intellectual Property Organization; the World Mete-
orological Organization; and the World Tourism Organization.
At the present moment, explicit mention should also be made of
the two regional economic organizations, which at the moment of the
signing of the Final Act were still far away from cooperation, but
gradually will become interesting forums for East-West discussions:
the European Economic Community ("EEC") and the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA" or "Comecon"). 36 In the fol-
lowing some additional information will be given on the involvement
of only the most relevant organizations.
A. Economic Commission for Europe
The ECE was established by the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations in 1947. 37 In addition to a plenary organ and a
secretariat, it consists of fifteen "Principal Subsidiary Bodies," usually
referred to as the Committees, like the Coal Committee, the Inland
Transport Committee, the Electric Power Committee, and the Com-
mittee on the Development of Trade. Since the 1960s, three important
organs have been added: the Senior Economic Advisers, the Senior
Advisers on Science and Technology, and the Senior Advisers on En-
vironmental Problems.38 These additions indicate the focal points in
the present activities of the ECE.
The activities of the ECE have greatly influenced the negotiations
during the CSCE. On several issues prior agreement had been reached
in the relevant ECE committee and on others extensive discussions
31. FINAL ACT, supra note 3, at § 4 (Science and technology).
32. Id. at § 6.1 (Development of transport).
33. Id.
34. Id. at § 6.3 (Economic and social aspects of migrant labour).
35. Id. at § 5 (Environment).
36. See infra § V.C.
37. On the history of the ECE, see Rostow, The Economic Commission for Europe, III INT'L
ORG. 254 (1949).
38. Bailey & Bailey, All-European Co-operation: the CSCE's Basket Two and the ECE, 1976/
1977 INT'L J. (Canada) 386, 388-91.
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had been taken place.3 9 The ECE is mentioned thirteen times in the
Final Act. It is therefore no surprise that the main fields of coopera-
tion laid down in Basket II run parallel with the main areas of activi-
ties of the ECE and reflect the same compromises between East and
West on priority setting.40 Moreover, the ECE is also referred to in
the Part on the follow-up of the CSCE as a framework for multilateral
implementation. 41
The ECE, for its part, has from the start recognized the impor-
tance of the CSCE process and has even considered it as one of its
tasks to assist in implementing the relevant provisions of the Final Act
and the concluding documents of the follow-up meetings. It has done
so both in a direct and in an indirect way. Thus, for example, it as-
sisted in organizing expert meetings on economic cooperation in the
Mediterranean in 1979 and 1984,42 and convened a symposium on
East-West trade in 1986. 43 In addition, the ECE is involved in the
conduct of research and the exchange of information in conformity
With requests to that effect in the Final Act. The ECE Secretary is
invited to the CSCE follow-up meetings to report on the activities of
the ECE in the implementation of the Final Act and to make propos-
als for future involvement. These activities are still of a very modest
nature and can hardly be considered as implementation measures.
This, however, would seem to be due not so much to the power (or
lack thereof) of the ECE or the inappropriateness of its forum, but to
a lack of consensus on the part of the participating states on the imple-
mentation itself."
For the ECE, its involvement has also resulted in a certain draw-
back. While it had for a long time remained rather unaffected by the
East-West controversies, its connection with the CSCE process -
and, therefore, with the political issues involved next to the purely
economic issues - has made it more vulnerable to the ups and downs
of the political climate in Europe.45
39. Id. at 395.
40. Id. at 391, 395. See also Partsch, The Final Act of Helsinki and Non-discrimination in
International Economic Relations, 36 ZEITSCHRIFr FIYR AUSLANDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT
UND V6LKERRECHT 1, 13 (1986).
41. FINAL ACT, supra note 3 at § 1(c).
42. This although the Part of the Final Act dealing with the Mediterranean contains no
reference to the ECE; Bailey & Bailey, supra note 38, at 406.
43. See United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Committee on the Development
of Trade, ECE SYMPOsiuM ON EAST-WEST BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES AND TRADE PROSPECTS,
Thessaloniki (Sept. 8-11, 1986) (TRADE/SEM.8/2) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of
International Law).
44. N. ROPERS & P. SCHLOTrER, supra note 30, at 40-41.
45. Bailey & Bailey, supra note 38, at 402-06.
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B. United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization
Although for historical reasons there existed a fair amount of dis-
trust towards UNESCO on the part of the East European States at the
moment of the Conference, 46 that organization is nevertheless referred
to in the Final Act in relation to cooperation in the field of science and
technology, and in the final section concerning the follow-up. The Fi-
nal Act contains the recommendation for the participating states, that:
more effective utilization be made of the possibilities and capabilities of
existing international organizations, intergovernmental and non-govern-
mental, concerned with science and technology, for improving exchanges
of information and experience, as well as for developing other forms of
cooperation in fields of common interest, for example:
... [t]hrough their participation in particular international scientific and
technological co-operation programmes, including those of UNESCO
and other international organizations, pursuit of continuing progress to-
wards the objectives of such programmes, notably those of UNISIST,
with particular respect to information policy guidance, technical advice,
information contributions and data processing. 47
Both at the follow-up meetings and at expert meetings and seminars
the UNESCO has played and is meant to play a role in the implemen-
tation process. This role has three main aspects: a) assisting in the
preparation of international conferences, like expert meetings; 48 b)
providing a framework for meetings;49 and c) expressing its view at
follow-up meetings, expert meetings and seminars.50
Furthermore, it is significant that UNESCO, which is a world-
wide organization, has established three regional centres for Europe:
the European Centre for Co-ordination, Research and Documentation
in Social SCiences, in Vienna in 1964; the European Centre for Leisure
and Education, in Prague in 1968; and the European Centre for
46. For the main reasons, see Chossudovsky & Siotis, Organized All-European Co-operation:
The Role of Existing Institutions, in BEYOND DtTENTE: PROSPECTS FOR EAST-WEST CO-OPER-
ATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE 159, 168-69 (N. Andr6n & K.E. Birnbaum eds. 1976).
47. FINAL ACT, supra note 3, at Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Tech-
nology and of the Environment, § 4 Science and Technology, subsection Forums and Methods of
Co-operation.
48. Thus, e.g., the scientific forum at Hamburg asked the UNESCO to organize conferences
and seminars on humanities and social sciences, see annexes 1 and 4 of the report of the forum(copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law), and at the expert meeting at
Valetta the UNESCO was encouraged to convene a symposium on seismicity in the Mediterra-
nean and its repercussions in Europe and Africa.
49. See, e.g. report of the Hamburg scientific forum, supra note 46, at annexes I and 4;
section on co-operation and exchanges in the field of culture of the concluding document of the
Madrid follow-up meeting, para. 4 (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law);
report of the Valetta expert meeting, paras. 6 and 9 (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of
International Law).
50. The UNESCO has done so at the follow-up meetings and at the meetings in Hamburg,
Valetta and Venice.
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Higher Education, in Bucharest in 1972. In addition, and also before
the signing of the Final Act, UNESCO has organized three confer-
ences of European Ministers to improve East-West cooperation:
MINEUROP in 1967 in the area of education; MINESPOL in 1970 in
the area of science; and EUROCULT in 1972 in the area of culture. 51
By contrast, UNISIST, to which the Final Act of Helsinki contains an
explicit reference, has been established as a world-wide program for
scientific information. 52
After the adoption of the Final Act, the General Conference of
UNESCO decided to broaden the activities under some of its program-
mes in view of the implementation of the relevant provisions of the
Final Act. The Director-General was instructed to make proposals
for other new activities and to prepare a report for the follow-up meet-
ing. Among the activities undertaken by UNESCO, mention may be
made of the drafting of a list of literature for translation and dissemi-
nation in Europe, the promotion of the exchange of radio programs,
the establishment of a cultural data bank, and the emission of a calen-
dar with cultural events.
A handicap for UNESCO in this field of European activities re-
mains the lack of a regional co-ordinating organ. A proposal made by
the Director General in 1974 to establish a secretariat unit for all-
European activities was rejected. His alternative proposal to set up an
intergovernmental committee to fill the gaps between ministerial meet-
ings was rejected by the West European states (with the exception of
France) because of fear of interference by non-European governments
in intra-European matters. 53
C. European Economic Community and Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance
Since 1973, the EEC has had exclusive powers in the field of exter-
nal trade policy. 54 Consequently, it was the demand of the EEC and
its Member States that the Community be involved in the negotiations
and that the relevant parts of the agreements be submitted to it for
approval. The Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro therefore signed the
Final Act in his double capacity as Head of Government of Italy and
51. See Ghebali, supra note 18, at 120.
52. Id. at 122-23.
53. See Chossudovsky & Siotis, supra note 46, at 170-71.
54. According to Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, this should have been the case as from
January 1, 1970. For practical reasons, however, the Council of Ministers authorized the Mem-
ber States to conclude or extend bilateral agreements with East European States until December
31, 1972. See A. BLOED, THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECO-
NOMIC ASSISTANCE 190 n.810 (1988).
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as acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the European Com-
munities. 5" For the same reason the EEC is also represented in the
person of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers in his/her dual
capacity at the follow-up meetings and other conferences in order to
have the opportunity to put forward the common position of the mem-
ber states on relevant issues. Both the Council of Ministers and other
EC organs have referred in resolutions to the Final Act and to their
determination to contribute to its implementation. In fact, however,
the economic issues which have figured on the CSCE agenda so far,
have not been of great importance to the EEC.
This is different for the other (mainly) European economic organi-
zation, the CMEA. That organization, however, has no exclusive
powers in the field of external relations on substantive issues,5 6 and
therefore cannot claim a special position in the negotiations and con-
clusions in the framework of the CSCE process. Right from the begin-
ning, one of the main targets of the implementation of the
commitments laid down in Basket II has been for the CMEA to con-
clude an agreement of cooperation with the EEC as an agreement be-
tween two equal organizations. This was considered to be a first,
important, and positive step in the direction of closer economic coop-
eration and a more stable detente in Europe.
The EEC has refused such a broad agreement for a long time, tak-
ing the view that the two organizations have no comparable legal posi-
tion because of the CMEA's lack of substantive powers in the field of
external relations. Recently, however, a compromise has been reached
and a Joint Declaration between the two organizations was signed on
June 25, 1988 "on the basis of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe, and taking account of the results
of the subsequent stages of the CSCE process. ' ' 57 By adopting this
Declaration, the organizations established official relations with each
other and undertook the commitment to develop cooperation in areas
which fall within their respective spheres of competence and where
there is a common interest, to be determined by means of contacts and
discussions between their representatives designated for this purpose.58
Although this Declaration still constitutes a weak basis for direct co-
operation in substantive areas, it is meant to be the basis of an agree-
ment of cooperation between the two organizations. In its turn, this
55. For the text of the speech delivered by him in that capacity, see Mastny, supra note 2, at
70-71.
56. See A. BLOED, supra note 52, at 213-14.
57. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L157) 35 (1988).
58. Id. at paras. 1-3 of the Declaration.
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agreement may provide a forum for regular contacts and co-ordination
of activities concerning the implementation of certain provisions of the
Final Act. It may even provide the way for admission of the two orga-
nizations as full participants in the CSCE process.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Viewing the thirteen years since the adoption of the Final Act of
Helsinki, may one conclude that the institutional infrastructure as it
has developed makes the establishment of a separate institutional
structure for the CSCE process (or for certain of its elements) feasible
and desirable? And has the lack of such a structure thus far hampered
the process in any way?
In my opinion both questions should be answered in the negative.
No doubt the process has been hampered in many ways, especially by
unforeseen political events which have placed the d6tente under some-
times very heavy pressure; but none of these events or their effects
could have been prevented or even mitigated by any international
structure. If this were possible, enough appropriate bilateral and mul-
tilateral forums would have been available for that purpose. Several of
these forums have paid attention to the CSCE process and its continu-
ation, and to the implementation of the Final Act, even if only margin-
ally. However, this is not due to a lack of powers or institutional
structures on their part, but to a lack of political will on the part of
some participating states, which are also represented in these forums.
This lack of political will cannot be remedied by the mere establish-
ment of new structures.
It is submitted that the present scope for strengthening and deep-
ening East-West cooperation in the areas covered by the Final Act can
be fully exploited by the present structure of the CSCE combined with
the involvement of existing organizations. Certain new procedures
may be needed to make the follow-up meetings and their review and
appraisal functions more effective. First of all, one could think of a
regular or even quasi-permanent forum of general consultation and co-
ordination during the periods between the follow-up meetings, for ex-
ample at the level of the ambassadors in the capital where the next
follow-up meeting is scheduled to take place.59 In addition, the possi-
bility of convening ad hoc meetings to discuss specific problems in re-
lation to the implementation of the Final Act could be enlarged and
made more flexible.6° Finally, a fixed schedule of the follow-up meet-
59. See N. ROPERS & P. SCHLOT-TER, supra note 30, at 34-36.
60. In this respect, see the procedures agreed upon at the Vienna follow-up meeting concern-
ing the exchange of information and bilateral meetings on questions relating to the human di-
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ings and a fixed place for this meetings could make the preparation
and organization of these meetings more efficient and would end the
time-consuming discussions on when and where the next meeting will
take place, although some fear that it would take away much of the
pressure during the meeting to reach consensus on the final document
in order to end the meeting.61 Be this as it may, these and other such
measures do not call for any permanent institutional structures. After
all, the principal contribution that the existing organizations - where
possible and desirable in close coordination and cooperation with the
specific CSCE meetings - can make to the CSCE process as such and
to the implementation of the Final Act, is to improve the international
climate through all forms of East-West cooperation, even in areas
which, from a political or economic point of view, are only of marginal
importance. In the long run this may result in a situation where a
specific organization or organizations for Pan-European cooperation
are feasible and desirable. This, however, would be the result of, not
the logical instrument towards sincere and fruitful cooperation.
In the above survey of the involvement of existing organizations,
emphasis has been on issues contained in the Second Basket. This
would seem to be a realistic reflection of the practice so far. For the
other two Baskets, on security and on cooperation in the humanitarian
field, the existing global organizations - with the exception, to a cer-
tain extent, of the UNESCO and the International Labour Organiza-
tion62 - have not yet developed any structure or program for
specifically Europe-oriented activities in these fields,63 while organiza-
tions like the NATO, the Warsaw Pact Organization, the Council of
Europe and the Western European Union offer a forum for part of the
participating states only. At the moment, therefore, the conferences
and other meetings as part of the CSCE process are the only, or at
least the principal forums for discussing security issues and humanita-
rian cooperation in a Pan-European context. This could change in the
future. Indeed, if the East European and West European security or-
ganizations (the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO) were to es-
tablish a formal and more or less institutionalized forum for
consultation, providing a more permanent character for informal and/
mension of the CSCE. Section on "Human dimension of the CSCE" in the Final Document
signed on January 19, 1989 (provisional publication by the U.S. Information Agency, copy on file
with the Michigan Journal of International Law), at 37-38.
61. See N. RoPERS & P. SCHLOTrER, supra note 30, at 36-38.
62. For the European regional conferences convened by the ILO at regular intervals, see
Chossudovsky & Siotis, supra note 46, at 172-73.
63. For the humanitarian field, see Ghebali, Helsinki An X. Bilan de la Troisijme Corbeille de
la CSCE, in DtFENSE NATIONALE, at 31-46 (Dec. 1986).
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or irregular contacts that are going on at the moment, that would fit
well into the present institutional structure. It would also be an im-
portant development in the field of humanitarian affairs if the Council
of Europe were to establish formal relations with Eastern European
states. This would institutionalize and broaden the contacts which ex-
ist at the moment.
The structures described above for Basket II, although certainly
not perfect, could serve as a model for Baskets I and III. The ECE, a
regional body of a global organization, has established formal relations
with the two main sub-regional bodies in Europe in the same field of
activities: the EEC and CMEA. In the same way, for security matters
this structure might be preferable over a separate Pan-European secur-
ity organization as proposed by Secretary-General Gorbachev. The
European forums for cooperation and consultation should preferably
form part of - or at least have direct links with - global forums.
This also holds good for cooperation and consultation in the humani-
tarian area, since policies in connection with, for example, immigra-
tion, migrant workers, tourism, and exchanges in the fields of
information, culture and education, certainly have their specific Euro-
pean dimensions, but are at the same time closely connected with poli-
cies outside of Europe, both in a legal and in a practical way. It
would, therefore, be of great importance if organizations like the
United Nations, UNESCO, the International Labour Organization
and other relevant global organizations would establish European
committees for that purpose. This is even more self-evident for secur-
ity matters. As it was said by Chossudovsky and Siotis:
It has been rightly stated that peace is meaningful only as world peace,
not as regional peace. Much that was finally agreed by the Conference in
this regard has been derived from earlier work done by the United Na-
tions and it has been generally recognized that efforts at implementing
such decisions at regional and at global levels are complementary and
mutually reinforcing." 4
It may thus be concluded that the CSCE provides the proper fo-
rum and context for the proposal by Gorbachev referred to at the be-
ginning of this article. Implementation of the proposal would not
require the establishment of a separate international organization. It
would seem desirable, however, that in addition to the periodic consul-
tation forums which the CSCE system provides - the convening of
which should be made more flexible - a more permanent forum be
available for NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization. That forum
64. Chossudovsky & Siotis, supra note 46, at 177. See the comprehensive study by Ohebali,
supra note 18.
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should, however, preferably be built into, or be closely connected to,
the global framework of the United Nations to ensure that European
security issues are discussed and negotiated in the context of world
security. In the same way, the establishment of European bureaus,
secretariats or other bodies within other global international organiza-
tions could be instrumental in facilitating the discussions on the con-
tinuation of the CSCE process, and on the implementation of all three
Baskets of the Final Act in a broader - both substantively and geo-
graphically - context.
